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1 Immortality
Immortality
IV. Christianity
Immortality means the ability to live forever. The
Christian tradition of thinking about immortality
wrestled from its origins with the ancient Greek
philosophical inheritance. In his Phaedo, Plato con-
sidered humans to be immortal because they are en-
dowed with non-physical souls; immortality is an
attribute of the soul, while the body is its “prison,”
from which it will be freed after death. The New
Testament provides Christianity with another posi-
tion. In the famous passage on the resurrection
(1Cor 15 : 12–58), Paul affirms the resurrection of
humans on account of Christ who was first raised
from the dead. Thus immortality in Christianity is
a gift. Only God is immortal; on account of Christ’s
resurrection, immortality is given to mortals as gift
in salvation. To this key notion is added another
significant aspect based on Christ’s resurrection.
Immortality means the resurrection of the body.
Christ’s bodily resurrection, although as a body en-
dowed with properties not limited to spatial restric-
tion (i.e., Christ walking through closed doors in
John 20 : 26), was the object of Christian hope that
body and soul in their unity would be raised after
death.
Early Christian theologians struggled with the
dual legacy of the Platonist view of the soul’s im-
mortality and the New Testament’s view of the bod-
ily resurrection. In a context in which immortality
was of existential concern, Christianity came to be
regarded as the “medicine of immortality.” The
idea of an immortal soul that had its origins in God
could be connected to Gen 1 : 27, yet there was a
danger that this connection brought the soul too
close to God. Justin (Dial. 4–6) stressed that the soul
was not un-begotten (γννητς), like God, and
thus was not immortal (θνατς) by virtue of its
being.
Origen, for example, appropriated the Platonic
view that physical life is a purification process for
the immaterial soul. The eternal Trinitarian God re-
quires an eternal goal for its action. Yet the goal
must be spiritual because there is no matter in God
(cf. Princ. 1.4.3–5). Spiritual creatures are immortal,
but are endowed with freedom. They sin by virtue
of free will (Princ. 2.8.3) and are thereby alienated
from God. Redemption for Origen means the return
of souls to the spiritual world until the ‘Apokatasta-
sis’ (Princ. 1.7.5; cf. 1 Cor 15 : 24–28). Origen was
committed to the idea of the soul’s eternal relation
to God. Yet because he held onto the idea of cyclical
ages of the world, he was criticized for teaching the
notion of “soul wandering” (Metemphychosis).
Other early Christian apologists rejected this
Platonic notion. Tertullian (ca. 160–225 CE) argues
in the tradition of Stoic metaphysics that all reality,
including the soul, is corporeal and made from ma-
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terial particles. Material continuity is thus necessary
for survival. The reward for martyrdom was the
“crown of immortality” (Eusebius, Hist. eccl., bk. 5).
Gregory of Nyssa further developed the Plato-
nist tradition. In De mortuis oratio he alludes to
Plato’s Phaedo by describing the world, specifically
the body, as “prison” of the soul. When death frees
the soul from this prison, the soul is able to see
the heavenly things for all eternity. In De anima et
resurrectione Gregory of Nyssa defines the soul in
view of Gen 1 : 26 as “created, living intellectual es-
sence.” While the soul on earth can only strive to-
wards God, it will be perfected at the eschaton in
the mode of μωσις θεῷ: God’s love faciliates the
soul’s growth in knowledge, but through this pro-
cess the soul only becomes similar to God, not like
God. Christ wins immortality and incorruptibility
for humans that is given to them in baptism. The
soul is not pre-existent, but is created. The soul’s
“post-existence,” if such a term can be used, is char-
acterized by eternal participation in God as the re-
sult of redemption.
Augustine owes his understanding of the soul’s
immortality to a reading of Ploninus, particularly
the Enneades 4.7. According to Plotinus the soul is a
spiritual nature that is noncorporeal. Thus the
soul – because it knows truth and divinity – must
be held apart from the body. When, however, the
soul is connected to the body, it is still immortal
and retains its capacity to both perceive and to ori-
ent itself to its origins in the divine realm. Augus-
tine’s theology is based on this idea of the soul’s
immortality (anima, sometimes also animus –
spirit). The soul originates in the intelligibl0e
world and has its end there as well. Augustine con-
ceives the body/soul dualism against the backdrop
of eternity, and this conception orients his reading
of the Bible. Yet his commitment to the soul’s im-
mortality is in tension with Christian belief in the
resurrection of the body. He never resolves this ten-
sion, neither in his early text De immortalitate ani-
mae nor in his main speculative work De trinitate.
Already in book 2 of the Soliloquiae Augustine gives
a proof for the immortality of the soul. Only if the
soul is immortal can it – following an ancient philo-
sophical axiom – know the eternal God. Augustine
takes up this argument in Imm. an. in order to
work out the aporia of learning that is described in
Solil. 2.19.33: How can the soul learn knowledge
(disciplina), when it doesn’t already possess know-
ledge, and how can it possess knowledge, when it
has not learned it? Augustine solves this problem
in Platonist fashion: Knowledge is always present
in the soul before it is even aware of it; the soul
does not learn anything new, but discovers within
itself what it has always known (cf. Immort. an. 2,
8–9, 17; Solil. 2.22, 24). Augustine’s solution pre-
supposes the pre-existence of the soul, an idea that
also refers to immortality. In the Confessions, how-
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ever, Augstine derives introspection as the path to-
wards knowledge of God from immortality. Imm.
an. is unique among Augustine’s texts because
there is no Christian dimension to it. When Augus-
tine works out his doctrine of sin, he relativizes the
idea of the soul’s immortality: The soul is indeed
immortal, “but it can be said to die metaphorically
through sin and loss of God and happiness”
(O‘Daly: 329). Yet Augustine remains committed to
the idea of the soul’s immortality; he continues to
identify vita with anima/animus (Immort. an. 16;
Beat. 2.7); because the soul is essentially alive, it
cannot die.
With the re-discovery of Aristotle in late medie-
val philosophy, the reign of Platonism seemingly
came to an end. Thomas Aquinas used the concep-
tual resources of Aristotelian hylomorphism (mat-
ter-form metaphysics). He construed human beings
as compounds of matter and form. A human person
is a substantial unity of soul (form) and body (mat-
ter). Prima facie, it seems that according to the Tho-
mistic view, human persons are not identical to im-
material souls but are only partly composed of
immaterial souls. Aquinas argues in the Aristotelian
tradition that a human person is identical to an in-
dividual substance in the species of “rational ani-
mal.” The person is neither the soul nor the body,
but is constituted by soul (substantial form) and
body (matter). Aquinas even argues, that “my soul
is not me” (Aquinas, Comm. 1 Cor. 15.1.2.). Surpris-
ingly, in the Thomistic account of resurrection the
complete person can continue to exist without a
body. The tradition assumes an intermediate state
after natural death and before bodily resurrection.
According to Aquinas, even in this impoverished
state the person continues to exist and is able to
contemplate God.
How is this possible? The person is more than
just the sum of its constituent parts, soul and body.
The person is constituted by soul and body, but not
identical to them. The key to understanding sur-
vival in the afterlife seems to be that just as a person
can survive the severance of a limb, so can the per-
son survive the loss of its entire body, one of its
constituent parts (cf. Stump). On the other hand:
The person cannot survive the loss of the substan-
tial form, the soul, in the same way it can survive
the loss of the body. But if the soul can exist with-
out the body, is it not then an independent entity,
and thus in a Cartesian sense a substance (cf. Aqui-
nas, Summa theologiae 1.75.4)? Personal identity de-
pends solely on this substantial soul, which is em-
bodied only accidentally. The Thomistic soul is, like
a Platonic form, only a “visitor” in space and time.
It belongs to a non-material realm. If the matter
configured by a Platonic form ceases to exist, the
form nevertheless continues to exist. The same is
true for the soul in Aquinas. The ontological prior-
ity of the immaterial soul in the Thomistic account
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becomes even more prominent when the issue of
bodily resurrection is considered. For Aquinas, the
resurrected body is identical to the earthly body,
even after a temporal gap during the intermediate
state. How can a corruptible body, made from mate-
rials like water and carbon, be identical to an incor-
ruptible body made from some entirely different
“spiritual stuff”? It seems that the body that did
exist in this world did not endure so as to exist in
the afterlife.
According to Aquinas the resurrected body is
identical to the natural body because each substance
has but one substantial form. It is not the case that
the soul as form works on other substantial forms
as mediators (like molecules, chemical elements
etc.). The soul as substantial form directly config-
ures prime matter (cf. Summa theologiae 1.76.4; De
principiis naturae 1.349). Prime matter is not a sub-
stance; it has no form of its own. All it can do is
receive forms. Thus, whenever the soul becomes
embodied (inserted in prime matter) the very same
body is formed. The body receives its identity en-
tirely from the soul. The ontological priority of the
soul is striking. Aquinas is indeed not a substance
dualist, “because what there is to the body if it is
abstracted from the soul – prime matter – hasn’t
the stature to be a partner in any sort of dualism.
It cannot even exist on its own” (Leftow: 137–38).
On the Thomistic account, a human being is just “a
soul dipped in dust” (cf. Leftow).
The Protestant Reformers insisted on the cen-
trality of Christ for understanding life after death,
while at times gesturing to the Platonic legacy.
Martin Luther rejected the notion of purgatory that
had been affirmed in Catholicism since the Fourth
Lateran Council from 1254. Luther regarded this
notion, developed on Augustine’s distinction be-
tween the purifying fire that purged souls and the
fire of the Last Judgment (Bremmer: 66  pls pro-
vide bibliographical information  ), as unscrip-
tural. Luther’s focus is christocentric and biblical:
the passage through death to eternal life is accom-
panied by Christ, the angels, and all the saints (Lu-
ther 1969: 112); after death life is characterized by
the eternity of the triune God. The future life in
God is an object of faith, not rational thinking:
“Unless we believe it by faith, eternity is beyond
expression.” (Luther 1972: 227 [to Isa 53 : 8]) Given
his Christological focus, Luther sees immortality
entirely in terms of the bodily resurrection
(Wiemer: 170–82).
John Calvin, noted for his early treatise Psycho-
pannychia (1534/42), addresses the soul in the in-
terim between death and the Last Judgment, an is-
sue first noted by Augustine concerning the soul’s
relation to the divine immortality during a period
in which it was separated from the body. Calvin de-
nounces Anabaptists and some Lutherans who in-
sist that the soul “sleeps” during this time, and af-
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firms a notion of “rest,” thereby integrating the
Platonic idea of the soul’s immortality in relation
to Paul’s notion in Phil 1 : 23 concerning a desire
for death in order to be with Christ.
With the Enlightenment the idea of immortal-
ity took a critical turn. Immanuel Kant made the
immortality of the soul a postulate of practical rea-
son, arguing that the progress of virtue was an infi-
nite task (5 : 133; p. 246). The theologian Friedrich
Schleiermacher took Kant’s critical philosophy in
order to claim that the doctrines concerning the
“last things,” specifically the resurrection of the
body and life eternal, were to be considered “pro-
phetic doctrines,” meaning that they refer to future
possibilities rather than to immediate self-scon-
sciousness. While their content is related to the NT,
according to Schleiermacher’s logic, it does not be-
long in the canon of scripture and is merely an ex-
pression of yearning and hope (1999: §§ 257–63).
Emanuel Swedenborg’s Heaven and Hell from
1758 offers a speculative alternative to the critical
restrictions in Kant’s legacy. Swedenborg recounts
visions he had about life in the next world, claim-
ing that there is no metaphysical gap between this
world and the world of the dead (McDannell/Lang:
186). After death, the soul enters the spirit world, a
middle place between heaven and earth. The soul’s
functions continue just as on earth; one’s personal-
ity and lifestyle remains, and life continues to be
inherently social. Swedenborg’s visions inspired
Emerson and were ridiculed by Kant (McDannell/
Lang: 182). The significant idea is that souls are
transparent to their inner nature; they can thus
progress psychologically and spiritually, though
not as a result of punishment or purgation, but in
society until a point where they are deemed ready
for the higher state of heaven. Thus Swedenborg
added a social dimension to the Kantian legacy of
eternal progress. Ralph Waldo Emerson, who ac-
knowledges Swedenborg as an inspiration writes in
his “Immortality” that depth characterizes immor-
tality, not length. On encountering a great person
and their works, one experiences “immortal mo-
ments” that comes from “a great integrity” or “a
deep love” or “a strong will [that] arms us above
fear.”
In 20th-century Protestant theology there was a
general tendency to abandon classical metaphysics
as a conceptual tool in understanding the Christian
notion of immortality. The Greek notion of an inde-
structible immaterial soul seemed inadequate to
capture the two tenants of this Christian doctrine:
bodily resurrection and divine grace as sole cause of
survival. A radical proposal was made by the so-
called “Ganztod-Theologie” which was developed
by Karl Barth (cf. Barth: 524) and others. According
to this view, the entire person as a psycho-physical
unity dies completely at the time of natural death.
The person is not endowed with an immaterial sub-
Encyclopedia of the Bible and Its Reception 12 (© Walter de Gruyter, Berlin/Boston 2015)
6
stance that is not subjected to physical decay and
destruction. After having died completely, the per-
son is then re-created anew by the grace of God on
judgment day, or – alternatively – immediately fol-
lowing natural death. While this view successfully
emphasizes the role of grace, it fails to offer a theo-
retically rigorous alternative to the traditional
philosophical theologies it wished to overcome for
a simple reason: The modus operandi of how some
person that was entirely created anew by God could
be me (or someone else who had died, for that mat-
ter) is not answered.
Filling this theoretical gap, contemporary ana-
lytic philosophy gave rise to a renaissance of rigor-
ous and conceptually advanced theories of Christian
immortality. Since dualism was no longer the domi-
nant position in recent philosophy of mind, many
analytic theologians and philosophers tried to de-
velop accounts, which were not conceptually tied to
Platonic or Cartesian forms of dualism. One promis-
ing candidate is the so-called “constitution theory,”
which was made popular by Lynne Baker. Its cen-
tral claim is that a person is neither identical to a
biological organism, nor is it an independently ex-
isting substance. The physical body is not identical
to the person, but it constitutes the person. A sub-
stantial soul is not required. The constitution
theory promises “Christianity without the soul”
and still avoids collapsing into materialism. The
body is not identical to the person because it lacks
some of the properties the person has. The body as
such has no intentional states. Neither my hand nor
my brain tissue ever wants to greet another person,
only a person has the mental state of wanting to
greet someone. Persons are thus essentially beings
with a capacity for mental content or intentional
states. Even more specifically, a person is essentially
a being with the reflexive capacity to think of one-
self as oneself, a being that is endowed with a first-
person perspective. Finally, persons are essentially con-
stituted by a physical organism. Persons cannot sur-
vive the destruction of their body, but persons con-
stituted by a body can survive radical changes in
their constituting matter. It is necessary for a per-
son to have a constituting body, but it may not be
necessary to have the same body all the time. This
account opens up interesting possibilities for un-
derstanding bodily resurrection.
The Christian belief in the afterlife requires the
surviving person to be the very same as the person
that existed in the natural world. The resurrected
human person must ultimately be embodied be-
cause human persons are essentially embodied. But
it might not be the same body. The earthly biologi-
cal body is corruptible, the resurrected body is in-
corruptible. Whatever is corruptible is essentially
corruptible. Thus pre- and post-mortem body can-
not be identical. Baker argues that other attempts
to somehow preserve bodily identity (like Paul’s
7 Immortality
seed-kernel metaphor) are much less plausible than
just giving up the bodily identity requirement. She
reads 1Cor 15 : 50 in this way. Paul writes: “flesh
and blood can never possess the kingdom of God,
and the perishable cannot possess immortality.”
The corruptible body cannot possess immortality.
Earthly organisms are essentially biological and
built from physical particles. Everything that is bio-
logical and built from physical particles is essen-
tially corruptible. The resurrected body is incor-
ruptible, thus it cannot be numerically identical to
a biological organism, which is just a physical body.
There is no identity preserving transformation from
one to the other.
The constitution view does not take being-a-
person as a contingent property of a fundamentally
non-personal organism. It gives the person much
greater ontological independence. A person is not a
biological organism that during certain times of its
lifespan displays personal characteristics. A person
is only constituted by an organism. For a person to
survive means that a first-person perspective sur-
vives. How can a first-person perspective survive if
it is not an indestructible substance? Here Baker
uses the classical distinction between free and natu-
ral divine knowledge: Free knowledge is divine
knowledge of contingent truths, natural knowledge
is divine knowledge of logical and metaphysical ne-
cessities. Whether a resurrected body constitutes
my first-person perspective is a contingent fact,
known freely by God. Therefore, whether or not it
obtains depends entirely on God’s free creative de-
cree. Thus, neither a substantial soul nor bodily
identity is required for post-mortem existence. It all
depends on whether God creates the unique first-
person perspective by having it constituted by a
non-physical body. Baker’s theory thus has a sur-
prising resemblance to the “Ganztod” idea of a
complete natural death and subsequent new crea-
tion. Whether the re-created body, which is not
identical to my earthly body, constitutes in fact me
is entirely up to a Divine decree.
By making the person independent of a particu-
lar physical body, this constitution theory does still
resemble classical dualism. It denies only the
strongest form of dualism, according to which the
human person can exist in a disembodied way. The
first-person perspective has, however, non-empiri-
cal identity conditions, which resemble those of
souls. In fact, the identity conditions of persons as
first-person perspectives are indistinguishable from
the mere “thisness” or haecceitas that according to
the prominent Christian dualist Richard Swinburne
individuates souls. It seems that the Christian belief
in immortality cannot rid itself of an at least im-
plicit or “thin” reference to something like a soul.
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